Lee Price at 09:11 on 27 May
The situations of Cain and Abraham are different in many respects, but I see one major similarity. Abraham is attached to his son in a way which is by definition "selfish." That is to say, he loves his son particularly and specifically; it is a strong feeling emanating from Abraham's individuality, from his "self." (Contrast this with the respect he showed the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah because they were human.) Cain hates his brother, also a strong feeling emanating from the individual on a particular and specific basis. I am suggesting that the move away from these strong "self"-ish feelings is the same in both cases: would light up the same neurons in the same parts of the brain. Then one is freer to see either God's will and/or the good more clearly.
Lenny Levin at 09:30 on 27 May
Now we are getting to the bottom of the issue! The conflict you are describing is the conflict between one's selfish interest and what one perceives as one's moral obligation. Conscience commands Abraham to overcome his love for his son; conscience similarly commands Cain to overcome his hatred for his brother.
But the distinction "autonomous/heteronomous" cuts differently: Is the basis of the moral command itself in the human being's own moral sense (whether reason or empathy), or in a divine command that contradicts the human-based moral sense? In this respect, the divine command that Abraham must contend with is heteronomous, whereas the call of conscience (that he is his brother's keeper, despite his disclaimer) -- the basis for which God holds him responsible -- is the universal innate moral sense that is autonomous.
Lenny Levin at 09:35 on 27 May
I will also dissociate WTC 9/11 from the other cases (qualifying my previous comment). Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atta were false prophets, because they mistakenly projected their hatred for the United States onto God, thus generating a false commandment to kill the infidels. We must go deeper into religious-ethical psychology whether to classify the command "kill the infidel" as autonomous (because it reflects the human hatred for the enemy) or heteronomous (because it contradicts the universal rational ethical dictate not to murder). My previous comment assumes the latter position, but I will leave the matter on the table for now.
I'm not as sure as you are that the human being's own moral sense (which always commands respect for another) can be validly distinguished from the command of God. What one perceives as one's moral obligation is not at all the same thing -- the perception can be anything from what everyone else agrees is a moral obligation (e.g. not killing your son) to what only a few others feel to be a moral obligation (e.g. ramming planes into the world trade center.) I frankly don't understand how Abraham's action is respectful to Isaac, though of course it is respectful to God. However, I believe it is necessarily respectful either to both or to neither.
ReplyDeleteWho said I was sure that one could validly distinguish between one's moral sense and the command of God? We can be mistaken about either one, or about both! Yet the imperative presents itself to us (even mistakenly) either as an imperative of reason, or as an imperative of divine mandate, or both. The Puritans in Salem burned witches because of ... Read morea purported imperative of God, transcending reason -- which we most of us today deem to have been mistaken. The Stalinists purged the followers of Trotsky and Bukharin because of a purported imperative of reason -- which we likewise deem to have been mistaken. We can psychoanalyze both and say that what the one thought was God's command and the other reason's mandate, were disguised self-interest. Yet the methodological distinction "autonomous/heteronomous" is still applicable.
ReplyDeleteYou write: "However, I believe it is necessarily respectful either to both or to neither." So do I believe. You and I are agreed in affirming a religious humanistic ethic, in which the demands from God's side and the demands from the human side are in agreement. That is where the autonomous and heteronomous outlooks coincide. But in the history... Read more of religious ethics, that was not always the case. The Akeda (in Kierkegaard's interpretation) is emblematic of a whole class of interesting cases where autonomous and heteronomous perspectives pulled different ways. I am theoretically interested in what happens in these conflicts, from the standpoint of those caught in them. Perhaps the author of the Akeda was doing a counterfactual thought experiment: "What if God demanded the unthinkable?"
You also asked:
ReplyDelete"Can I still ask whether "heteronomous" and "autonomous" are defined on the basis of the protagonist's (Cain, Abraham) perception or the observer's (you, me)? If a terrorist doesn't necessarily want to blow himself up but thinks that's what God commanded, is that heteronomy even though I see it as disguised and re-directed autonomy? If Abraham decides to sacrifice his son because he thinks it's a command from God, is that heteronomy even though I see it as an alternate description of autonomy?"
My answer: Yes, at least for now. Later (after a digression into metaphysics and Talmud) we will return to the question: even if we regard the tradition as human-created can it exercise a heteronomous claim on us, demanding that we mediate its demands with our own contemporary moral perspective?